CSS Essay Outline on Hybrid Warfare, Fifth Generation Warfare
In the modern parlance of military configuration, the much-hyped mantra of the Hybrid Warfare or the Fifth Generation Warfare is one of the most complexes, vague and threateningly overlapping component of war. In the post-WW II scenario, the US has developed world-class military might, sophisticated society, and exponentially booming economic prowess. This, with the grim progression of events, paved the way for countering the global US hegemonic status through asymmetric, unconventional warfare strategies. As a result, the invasive, lethal form of hybrid warfare gained momentum.
“There are but two types of men who desire war: those who haven’t the slightest intention of fighting it themselves, and those who haven’t the slightest idea what it is. … Any man who has seen the face of death knows better than to seek him out a second time.” Ibraham Lincoln
I. Hybrid warfare, Gray zone warfare, Fifth Generation warfare
A. Literal meaning
1. Combination of two or more distinct elements
B. In the parlance of modern military warfare
1. deliberately designed to remain below the threshold of conventional military conflict and open interstate war
2. Achieve those gains without escalating to overt warfare
3. Without crossing established red-lines
4. Without exposing the practitioner to the penalties and risks that such escalation might bring
5. The province of revisionist powers—those actors that seek to modify some aspect of the existing international environment—and the goal is to reap gains, whether territorial or otherwise
6. Unlike traditional warfare, grey-zone strategies will not produce decisive results within a defined time frame
II. The USA most powerful military empire
A. The most capable armed forces in the world spending more than the next nine nations combined
III. The changing character and the taxonomy of conflict. Why more conflicts are being fought at the lower end of the conflict spectrum.
B. Mass access to technology and communications
C. Asymmetric reactions to U.S. tactics in Afghanistan and Iraq
IV. Inevitable transformation of China and Russia military might
A. H.R. McMaster, Donald Trump’s national security adviser, once observed: “There are two ways to fight the United States: asymmetrically and stupid”.
B. The emerging powers do threaten critical U.S. interests through “strategic disruption” ,means the use of asymmetric methods.
V. Influence of Unrestricted Warfare (1999 PLA)by Qiao and Wang
A. A combination of different warfare and tactics for the achievement of objectives
VI. Why Russia and China evolved their unique strategies ?
A. The use of state of the art weapons by the US equally impressed by the precision-strike capabilities that America demonstrated in the first Gulf war, sought ways to reap some of the political and territorial gains of military victory without crossing the threshold of overt warfare.
VII. Chin’s “informationised” warfare-decades old military strategy
A. Revolution in military affairs
B. Advances in microprocessors
C. Sensors and communications
VIII. Fought in five domains
A. Physical landscape
B. Cognitive manipulation
C. Information spectrum
D. Economic fabric
E. Social configuration
IX. Comprehensive toolset: Methods employed
A. Disruptive cyber attacks
B. Propaganda and subversion
C. Economic blackmail and sabotage
D. Sponsorship of proxy forces
E. Creeping military expansionism
F. Destabilizing social media influence
G. Anonymous “little green men” instead of recognizable armed forces making overt violations of international borders
X. Major theatres
A. Russia annexed Crimea
Russia annexed Crimea and is fomenting civil conflict and separatism in eastern Ukraine; Russia’s aggressive actions in Ukraine, for example, directly challenge international norms against territorial annexation and put NATO solidarity at risk.
B. The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)
The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) burst into international headlines by beheading civilians and grabbing land in Iraq and Syria; ISIL controlling parts of Iraq and Syria threatens global energy markets, decreases regional stability, and increases the chance of conflict between Sunni and Shia communities.
C. Boko Haram in Nigeria
Boko Haram has been conducting a brutal insurgency in Nigeria; and
D. The Houthi rebellion in Yemen
The Houthi rebellion in Yemen has accelerated and driven the country’s president out of the capital. The Houthi insurgency increases the risk of a regional clash between Iraq and Saudi Arabia, which could also spark a broader Sunni-Shia conflict.
E. The Afghan Taliban in Afghanistan
F. The Kurds in the Middle East and Asia
XI. Major players
The clearest recent cases of grey-zone challenges are Russia’s intervention in Ukraine, China’s assertive behaviour in the South and East China Seas and Iran’s use of proxy militias to establish an arc of influence from Iraq through Syria into Lebanon. All three countries recognise and to some extent fear superior Western military power. But all of them also see vulnerabilities that they can exploit.
XII. Russian grey-zone strategy
A. To undermine faith in Western institutions
B. Encourage populist movements by meddling in elections
C. Using bots and trolls on social media to fan grievances and prejudice but in Ukraine Russia provided a near-textbook example of it in its modern form, using a variety of techniques: sophisticated propaganda that stirred up local grievances and legitimized military action; cyber attacks on power grids and disruption of gas supplies; covert or deniable operations, such as sending “little green men” (soldiers in unmarked green army uniforms) into Crimea and providing weapons and military support to separatist irregular forces; the threat of “escalating to de-escalate”, even including limited use of nuclear weapons. Since 2014, Russia has destabilized and dismembered Ukraine through the use of armed proxies, “volunteer” forces, and unacknowledged aggression.
XIII. Chinese greyzone strategy expanding the turbulent maritime periphery: Gray Zone conflicts with Chinese characteristics – String of Pearls policy-What are the pearls at the IOR- Indian Ocean region?
String of Pearls the network of Chinese intentions in India Ocean Region (IOR). The network of Chinese military and commercial facilities developed by China in countries falling on the Indian Ocean between the Chinese mainland and Port Sudan.
A. Gwadar (in Pakistan) the Port of Gwadar Port of Chhabar in Iran
B. Hambantota (in Sri Lanka) the Port of Hambantota for Chinese use
C. Chittagong (in Bangladesh) the Port of Chittagong which gives it a free access to the Bay of Bengal, which is strategically very important
D. Sittwe (in Myanmar) Kyaukpyu port. The Bay of Bengal has given China access to have a commercial Maritime facility which can be used as a military facility at the time of conflict
E. Maroa, Maldives the Male airport(Feydhoo Finolhu) to a Chinese company for 50 years at the cost of 4 million dollars
XIV. BRI’s six arms
A. New Eurasian Land Bridge
B. China – Mongolia – Russia Corridor
C. China – Central Asia – West Asia Corridor
D. China – Indochina Peninsula Corridor
E. China – Pakistan Corridor
F. Bangladesh – China – India – Myanmar Corridor
Chinese complicity in Russian-style hacker attacks on the West, but officially sanctioned trolls send out hundreds of millions of social-media posts every year attacking Western values and pumping up nationalist sentiment. In Asia, China is using gray zone tactics as part of a campaign of creeping expansionism in the South China Sea. China’s grey-zone campaign to assert uncontested control over the South China Sea and jurisdiction over disputed islands in the East China Sea has been going on for much longer, and has turned a darker shade of grey over time as the country’s confidence and power has grown. Since 2009, when China submitted a map to the United Nations showing a “nine-dash line” that supported its claim to “indisputable sovereignty” over 90% of the South China Sea (see map), it has applied what James Holmes of the US Naval War College has described as “small-stick diplomacy” (as opposed to the big stick of conventional naval power), using its highly capable coastguard and militiamen embedded in its fishing fleet to push other littoral states out of waters to which it claims ancestral rights.
It has been able to cow most of its neighbours into sulky acquiescence while avoiding a direct confrontation with American naval ships, which did not want to risk a major incident over what China portrayed as maritime policing. When in 2013 China took its provocations a step further by sending civil engineers to the Spratly and Parcel archipelagoes to construct artificial islands, Xi Jinping said China had no intention of militarising them. But in 2017, satellite images released by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies showed shelters for missile batteries and military radar installations being constructed on the Fiery Cross, Mischief and Subi Reefs in the Spratly Islands. Fighter jets will be on their way next. Mr Holmes suggests that such strategic gains cannot now be reversed short of open warfare, which means they will almost certainly not be. The advent of Mr Trump serves Chinese aims too. His repudiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership removed a challenge to China’s regional economic hegemony, a key objective of its grey-zone strategy. And the American president’s hostility to free trade and his decision to withdraw from the Paris climate accord has allowed Xi Jinping to cast himself, improbably, as a defender of the international order.
America’s inconsistency and lack of a long-term strategy in the Middle East has offered boundless opportunities for grey-zone advantage-seeking. In the Middle East, Iran is using, as it has for many years, subversion and proxy warfare in an effort to destabilize adversaries and shift the balance of power in the region. These are leading examples of the gray zone phenomenon today.
XVI. Israel and the challenges of Hybrid Warfare
XVII. India’s hybrid warfare against Pakistan
A. Hydrological warfare
B. Terrorism and separatism in Pakistan
C. Opposition to CPEC
D. The mantra of isolation
E. Media war and propaganda
F. Relations with Afghanistan
G. Construction of Iran’s Chabahar’s port
H. Surgical strikes
I. Transforming military doctrines
XVIII. Iran’s hybrid war against Pakistan
A. Stocking religious tensions
B. Giving space to India
XIX. The Arab countries hybrid war against Pakistan
A. Making Pakistani ports dysfunctional by creating law and order situation in Karachi and Pakistan
XX. Prominent complexities, paradoxes, and nuances at the heart of the gray zone idea
A. Gray zone” cannot mean everything if it is to mean anything
B. Gray zone challenges are the wave of the future—and a blast from the past
C. Gray zone conflict reveals both the strengths and weaknesses of the international order
D. Gray zone strategies are weapons of the weak against the strong—and of the strong against the weak
E. Confronting gray zone challenges requires both embracing and dispelling ambiguity
F. Gray zone conflict is aggression, but military tools are only part of the response
G. America is not poorly equipped for the gray zone—but it may not be fully prepared
H. Gray zone challenges can be productive and counterproductive at the same time
XXI. Options for Pakistan: Need of coherent response and counter strategies to hybrid warfare
A. Strengthening capacities
Pakistan should increase its abilities to understand, adapt, and prevail in these conflicts so that they do not grow to a level of strategic disruption that threatens vital Pakistan interests.
B. Best special operations forces and more specialized conventional capabilities
Pakistan must also ensure that some of its conventional capabilities are organized, trained, and equipped for these ever-expanding conflicts. Traditional military capabilities remain essential for deterring and defeating threats at the higher end of the conflict spectrum, but effectively dealing with an era dominated by gray zone conflicts requires more. The best special operations forces in the world and more specialized conventional capabilities will both be necessary to fight and win in the gray zone.
C. The defense complex should design special operations forces (SOF)
1. The conflict spectrum- SOF are deliberately designed, trained, and equipped to address the part of the conflict spectrum where gray zone conflicts occur.
2. In-depth cultural knowledge- they bring in-depth cultural knowledge to regional skirmishes around the world, often including language skills and years of building personal relationships. They can operate with low visibility and moderate risk, calling little attention to their actions. They can also provide highly capable headquarters elements to help oversee these complex challenges — organizations and leaders steeped in interagency and regional expertise, with deep cultural and unconventional warfare knowledge and experience.
D. Bolstering potent economic and financial tools
E. Developing arsenal of cyber weapons, expert special forces
F. Establishing a network of alliances
G. Capitalizing on unmatched soft power
H. Making media professional and autonomous
I. Bringing political and constitutional reforms
J. Putting an end to extra-territorial involvement in military and political affairs
K. Disbanding terror outfits
L. Improving mechanism against money laundering and terror financing